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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Suppose a federal law required government
officials to enter a Catholic church and use church
property
to
distribute
contraceptives
and
abortifacients over church’s objection. Such a law
would surely burden the church’s religion, even if the
government paid for the objectionable medications
and compensated the church for the use of its
resources. By commandeering church property, such
a law would force the church to be complicit in
activity to which it has serious religious objections.
That is what the government has done in this
case. The Little Sisters of the Poor are an order of
Catholic nuns who object to being forced to
participate in the distribution to their employees of
contraceptives and abortifacients.2 The government
insists that regulations of the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) relieve the nuns of the
obligation to pay for these drugs. However, the
government still commandeers health care plans
created and controlled by the nuns and uses them to
distribute contraceptives and abortifacients. State
and federal law treat these health care plans as the
property of the Little Sisters of the Poor. The nuns
thus make the unremarkable claim that the
government substantially burdens their religion
when it uses their property in ways that they find
religiously offensive.
Petitioners include other religious organizations and their
health care plans who are similarly situated to the Little Sisters
of the Poor. For convenience and clarity, however, this brief
refers only to the Little Sisters of the Poor.
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The courts below in this and similar cases,
however, have fundamentally misunderstood the
nature of the burden created by the Department’s
regulations. They thus frustrate Congressional policy
requiring the government to justify its actions in
such cases.
Specifically, the lower court focused on the
fact that the Little Sisters of the Poor are not
financially liable for contraception and that the
paperwork
requirements
created
by
the
Department’s regulations are minimal. No one,
however, claims that the nuns are being forced to
directly purchase contraception, nor is their religion
burdened because they have to fill out additional
forms. Such arguments miss the basic issue in this
case.
The
Department’s
regulations
exercise
sweeping authority over religious institutions. Given
that many religious believers object to all or some of
the drugs included in the contraceptive mandate,
dozens of lawsuits challenging those regulations have
been filed. Hundreds of other institutions must also
object to the Department’s regulations. The petition
for certiorari should be granted so that this Court can
resolve this “important question of federal law.”
ARGUMENT
By commandeering the health care plan
created, controlled, and owned by Petitioners, the
Department’s regulations force them to participate in
distributing religiously objectionable medications.
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I. The
Department’s
regulations
burden
Petitioners’ religion by commandeering
their property and using it to distribute
contraceptives and abortifacients.
The burden imposed by the Department’s
regulations can best be understood though analogies.
Suppose that there was a law that required the nuns
of the Little Sisters of the Poor to distribute
contraceptives personally to their employees. The
government would pay for the contraceptives and
compensate the nuns for their time and expenses, so
there would be no financial complicity in the
distribution of the medications. Furthermore, the
nuns would be free to voice their religious objections
while distributing the contraceptives and the
government would take steps to insure that anyone
receiving contraceptives from the nuns understood
their religious objections. Such a law would clearly
place a substantial burden on the nuns’ religious
exercise. Yet it would impose no financial burden on
the nuns, and handing out the contraceptives could
be done very easily, requiring far less effort than
other regulatory requirements with which Petitioners
must comply.
Now imagine that the law, rather than
requiring that the nuns personally distribute the
contraceptives, allowed a government official to enter
the nuns’ facilities and use their medicine carts and
other equipment to distribute contraceptives. Again,
the law would fully compensate the Little Sisters of
the Poor for their financial costs. Again, the nuns
would be free to follow the medicine carts through
their facility denouncing contraception and abortion,
and the government could take steps to make clear
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that the Little Sisters of the Poor object to the
provision of contraceptives with the nuns’ property.
Such a law would represent far more than a “de
minimis” burden on the nuns’ religion. Rather, it
would directly burden the nuns’ religious exercise in
the same way as the first hypothetical law, namely
by making them an involuntary party to the
distribution of medications to which they have
serious and sincere religious objections. The fact that
this hypothetical law is directed at the nuns’ property
rather than at their bodies does not change the fact
that they would be forced to be complicit in what they
sincerely regard as sinful behavior.
The Department’s regulations are analogous to
this second law. It is true that the Little Sisters of
the Poor have no financial liability for the purchase
of contraceptives, but they are not claiming that their
religious exercise is burdened because they must
purchase contraceptives. Rather, the Little Sisters of
the Poor have created a health care plan, a plan that
they control and that is their property.
The
government, in pursuit of its goals, is seeking to use
the nuns’ plan to distribute contraceptives. For the
government to do this constitutes a burden on
Petitioners’ religion, a burden that the court below
failed to grasp or properly consider.
A. State
and
federal
law
treat
employer-provided health care plans
as property of the employers, created
and controlled by them.
Health insurance plans do not spring into
existence ex nihilo, nor are they creations of the
government. Cf. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S.
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882, 887 (1996) (“Nothing in ERISA requires
employers to establish employee benefits plans. Nor
does ERISA mandate what kind of benefits
employers must provide if they choose to have such a
plan.”). Rather, they are devices of employers
designed to provide employees with certain benefits
as part of their compensation. The health care plan
of the Little Sisters of the Poor exists only because
the Little Sisters of the Poor created it.
As a matter of state law, employer-provided
health insurance is a contract between the employer
and the insurance provider to which the employee is
generally treated as a third-party beneficiary. See,
e.g., Southwest Health Plan, Inc. v. Sparkman, 921
S.W.2d 355 (Tex. App. 1996) (holding that an
employee was a third party beneficiary of a contract
between the employer and its health insurance
company); but see Cahill v. Eastern Benefit Systems,
Inc., 603 N.E.2d 788, 792 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding
that an employee could not sue as a third-party
beneficiary of a contract between an employer and
the insurance company providing benefits to the
employer’s employees).
In the case of self-insurance by the employer,
the relationship between the employer and the third
party administrator (TPA) is also contractual. See,
e.g., Multi-Craft Contractors Inc., v. Perico Ltd., 239
S.W.3d 33 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006) (deciding a dispute
between a self-insured employer and its third-party
administrator as a matter of contract law). Once
they are executed, contracts are, of course, a form of
personal property. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS Ch. 15 Introductory Note (AM. LAW
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INST. 1981) (noting that the law of assignment in
contract “is part of the larger subject of transfer of
intangible property.”).
To be sure, insurance contracts are a very
heavily regulated form of property. See Timothy S.
Jost & Mark A. Hall, The Role of State Regulation in
Consumer Driven Health Care, 31 AM. J. L. & MED.
395, 399 (2005) (“Health insurance is one of the most
heavily regulated industries in the United States.”).
Petitioners, however, are not challenging the
authority of the government to regulate employerprovided health insurance in general.3 Rather, they
are challenging the lawfulness of the way in which
the government has chosen to exercise that power in
this particular case. The fact that property is
generally subject to government regulation does not
alter the fundamental fact that it remains the
property of its owner.
In other contexts, federal law treats employerprovided health care plans as property of the
employer. For example, they may be assumed in
bankruptcy and are treated as property of the
employer’s bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. §365
(2012) (setting forth the trustee in bankruptcy’s
power to assume executory contracts). Although the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
the main federal statute governing employer3 There are, however, complex questions in this case over the
precise nature and scope of the government’s power to regulate
Petitioners’ health care plans under ERISA and the ACA. See
Petition for Certiorari at 11-13.
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provided insurance, does not govern Petitioners’
health care plan, this Court’s ERISA cases illustrate
that health care plans are the creatures of their
creators, namely employers. This Court has noted
that “[e]mployers or other plan sponsors are
generally free under ERISA, for any reason at any
time, to adopt, modify or terminate welfare plans.”
Curtiss-Wright Corporation v. Schoonejongen, 514
U.S. 73, 78 (1995). This is true even though ERISA
imposes on plan administrators fiduciary duties to
“ERISA’s fiduciary duty
plan beneficiaries. 4
requirement simply is not implicated where [an
employer], acting as the Plan’s settlor, makes a
decision regarding the form or structure of the Plan
such as who is entitled to receive Plan benefits and in
what amounts, or how such benefits are calculated.”
Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 444
(1999). Likewise, this Court has said that “decisions
regarding the form or structure of a plan are
generally settlor [i.e. employer] functions.” Beck v.
Pace Int’l Union, 551 U.S. 96, 101-102 (2007)
(internal citations and quotations omitted). In short,
federal law treats employer-provided health care
plans as the creation and creature of the employer.

4 It is worth noting that in ERISA argot, “plan administrators”
and “third party administrators” are not the same thing. “Plan
administrators” are generally the employers who set up the
plans. “Third party administrators,” in contrast, are mere
agents hired by the plan administrators to process claims and
perform other clerical functions on behalf of employers.
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B. The regulations use Petitioners’
health care plans to distribute
contraceptives and abortifacients to
which they have religious objections.
There are many ways in which the government
could ensure that Petitioners’ employees have access
to contraception without cost sharing, as required by
the Affordable Care Act (ACA). However, as the D.C.
Circuit explained, what the Department’s regulations
seek to do here is make obtaining contraception
“seamless from the beneficiaries’ perspective.” Priests
for Life v. Dept. of Health & Human Serv’s, 772 F.3d
229, 245 (D.C. Cir. 2014). This “seamlessness,”
however, is achieved only because the government
uses the religious objectors’ plans to distribute
contraceptives. Under the regulations, the TPA, an
agent hired by the Little Sisters of the Poor and
fireable by them, would process claims of employees
to contraception and insure that the religiously
offensive medications are distributed through
Petitioners’ plan.
See 26 C.F.R. §54.98152713AT(b)(2) (2015). The only reason that the TPA
has a relationship with Petitioners’ employees or
access to the information necessary to provide them
with contraception is because the TPA administers
the Little Sisters of the Poor’s health care plan. Thus,
contrary to the suggestions of lower courts in similar
cases, it is not true that “the acts that violate their
faith are the acts of third parties.” See East Texas
Baptist University v. Burwell, 2015 WL 3852811, at
*5 (5th Cir. 2015). In this context, the TPA is not
some remote stranger, a third-party unconnected
with petitioners. Rather the TPA is the nuns’ agent,
administering the nuns’ plan.
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The various attempts of the government to
accommodate the religious objections of Petitioners’
do nothing to eliminate these concerns. True, the
government claims to relieve the Little Sisters of the
Poor of financial complicity. It is a non sequitur,
however, to argue that because there is no financial
burden, there is no burden of any kind. See Thomas
v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding that
the government violated the Free Exercise clause
when it punished someone for refusing religiously
objectionable but paid employment); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (same). Likewise, the
employees would be notified in various ways that the
Little Sisters of the Poor are not paying for
contraceptives, See 26 C.F.R. §54.9815-2713A(d)
(2015) (“The notice [from the TPA to employees] must
specify that the eligible organization does not
administer or fund contraceptive benefits”), but this
does not change the fact that it is the nuns’ plan that
is being used to purvey contraceptives to which they
object. It is this use of their property that constitutes
a burden on Petitioners’ religion.
II. The Court should grant certiorari
because
the
lower
courts
have
misunderstood the nature of the burden
created by the Department’s regulations.
By misunderstanding the nature of the burden
on religion created by the Department’s regulations,
the lower courts threaten to deprive potentially
hundreds of religious organizations of the protection
afforded to them by Congress in the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Certiorari is thus
warranted in this case because there is an “an
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important question of federal law that… should be
settled by this Court.” Sup. Ct. R. 10(c).
A. The
lower
courts
mistakenly
conceptualized the burden.
The Tenth Circuit in this case misunderstood
the burden placed on the religious exercise of the
Little Sisters of the Poor by the Department’s
regulations. Its analysis focused on two issues. The
first was the fact that if the Little Sisters of the Poor
were to invoke the Department’s regulations, the
government would assume the financial costs of
providing contraception to their employees. See Pet.
App. 48a. (“The accommodation relieves the Plaintiffs
from complying with the Mandate and guarantees
that they will not have to … pay for … contraceptive
coverage.”).
The second was that filling out the paperwork
required by the Department’s regulations imposed
only a de minimis administrative burden. Id. at 48a
(“[T]hese de minimis administrative tasks do not
substantially burden religious exercise for purposes
of RFRA”). Other lower courts faced with similar
challenges to the Departments regulations have
characterized the burdens imposed on religious
objectors in similar terms. See, e.g., Priests for Life,
772 F.3d at 249 (“A review of the regulatory
accommodation shows that the opt-out mechanism
imposes a de minimis requirement on any eligible
organization”).
This
approach,
however,
is
misconceived.
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1. It is irrelevant that Petitioners are
not financially liable.
First, the fact that the government shoulders
the financial costs of providing contraception to
Petitioners’ employees is both unexceptional and
irrelevant. The Office of Management and Budget
estimates that in 2015 the federal government will
spend $1.1 trillion on the health care of American
citizens. Office of Management & Budget, Table 15.1
– Total Outlays for Health Programs: 1962-2020
available at:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/.
These subsidies take the form of everything
from financial support for basic medical research to
paying directly for the medical procedures of millions
of citizens. Through the Department’s regulations,
the government has opted to spend part of its health
care budget on contraception. There is nothing
unusual about this. It is also irrelevant to this case.
One obviously cannot claim that one’s religious
freedom is burdened when others behave in ways
that one finds religiously objectionable. As this
Court observed in Bowen v. Roy, for example,
religious freedom “simply cannot be understood to
require that the Government conduct its own
internal affairs in ways that comport with the
religious beliefs of particular citizens.” Bowen v. Roy,
476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986).
Contrary to the suggestion by the lower court,
however, challengers to the Department’s regulations
do not question this principle. See Pet. App. 91a
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(“Plaintiffs sincerely oppose contraception, but their
religious objection cannot hamstring government
efforts to ensure that plan participants and
beneficiaries receive the coverage to which they are
entitled under the ACA.”); Priests for Life, 772 F.3d
at 246 (“They have no RFRA right to be free from the
unease, or even anguish, of knowing that third
parties are legally privileged or obligated to act in
ways their religion abhors.”). The Little Sisters of
the Poor are not claiming that their religion is
burdened because the government pays for
contraception to which they object. Nor are they
claiming that their religion is burdened because their
employees might use medications at government
expense that the nuns believe to be sinful. In short,
they are not trying to keep the government from
providing contraception to their employees, nor are
they seeking to limit their employees’ ability to
obtain or use contraception at no expense.
As long-time observers of this kind of litigation,
we suspect that both the government and the lower
courts feel exasperated that having been relieved of
the obligation to purchase contraceptives, the Little
Sisters of the Poor and other objectors have the
temerity to challenge the Department’s regulations.5
Writing for the Seventh Circuit, for example, Judge Posner
rather shockingly suggested that the plaintiff, a Christian
liberal arts college, was lying when it claimed that it would
have no RFRA objection to the Department’s regulations if the
College’s health care plan was not used to distribute
abortifacients. See Wheaton College v. Burwell, 2015 WL
3988356, *6 (“At oral argument Wheaton’s lawyer said that his
client has no objection to the government’s using the college’s
insurers to provide emergency-contraceptive coverage as long as
(cont'd)
5
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Such impatience, however, is neither warranted nor
a sound basis for legal analysis. The fact that the
government has avoided violating RFRA by forcing
the Little Sisters of the Poor to pay for contraceptives
does not leave HHS free to violate RFRA by
commandeering the nuns’ health care plans. See
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2775
(2014) (“By requiring [religious objectors] … to
arrange for such coverage, the HHS mandate
demands that they engage in conduct that seriously
violates their religious beliefs” (emphasis added)).
2. It is irrelevant that the paperwork
required is “de minimis.”
The Tenth Circuit and other lower courts have
also emphasized that the Department’s regulations
require only that objectors fill out a simple form. See
Pet. App. 48a (“[T]hese de minimis administrative
tasks do not substantially burden religious exercise
for purposes of RFRA”). Doing so would take at most
a few minutes and is far less onerous than other
regulations with which the Little Sisters of the Poor
must comply. Compare Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at
________________________
(cont'd from previous page)
it’s not ‘using’ Wheaton’s contract with the insurers …. We
wonder.”). Elsewhere, in the opinion Judge Posner suggested
that the plaintiff’s real goal was to make it more difficult for
students to obtain abortifacients. See id. at *5 (“But it seeks to
make that access more difficult”). These asides were irrelevant
to the legal questions Judge Posner was addressing, but they do
reveal an unfortunate unwillingness to consider the nature of
the religious burdens created by the Department’s regulations.
It also speaks to the need for this Court to grant certiorari in
order to analyze these nationally important issues.
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237 (“All Plaintiffs must do to opt out is to express
what they believe and seek what they want via a
letter or two-page form. That bit of paperwork is
more straightforward and minimal than many that
are staples of nonprofit organizations’ compliance
with law in the modern administrative state.”). This
argument also misunderstands the nature of the
religious burden in this case. What is objectionable
about the Department’s regulations is not that they
require religious institutions to fill out additional
paperwork.
Rather, those regulations create a
burden by forcing religious institutions to participate
in the delivery of medications to which they have
sincere and grievous religious objections by
commandeering their property.
B. Widespread religious objections to
the regulations make a grant of
certiorari proper.
The nuns claim that through forced complicity
in the delivery of contraceptives and abortifacients,
the government will “substantially burden [their]
religious exercises.” See 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(a)
(2012). They are not alone in this belief. The
Department chose only to exempt “churches” from
the ACA’s contraceptive mandate, but hundreds of
organizations that fail to qualify as “churches”
nevertheless have grave religious objections to forced
complicity in the delivery of contraception or
abortifacients.
To give a single example, the Catholic Church
has well-articulated and long-standing religious
objections to both contraception and abortifacients.
See JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE (1995)

17
(articulating the Catholic Church’s opposition to
abortion); PAUL VII, HUMANAE VITAE (1968)
(articulating the Catholic Church’s opposition to
artificial birth control). It is reasonable to suppose
that some Catholic organizations will challenge any
law that requires that they be complicit in providing
such drugs. There are hundreds of Catholic religious
orders, primary and secondary schools, colleges and
universities, and social service organizations in the
United States. See generally THE OFFICIAL CATHOLIC
DIRECTORY ANNO DOMINI 2015 (2015). Perhaps the
most compelling evidence that the Little Sisters of
the Poor raise “an important question of federal law
that… should be settled by this Court,” Sup. Ct. R.
10(c), is that the Department’s regulations have been
repeatedly challenged in the lower courts by both
Catholic
organizations
and
non-Catholic
organizations. See Becket Fund for Religious Liberty,
HHS Information Central,
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/
(tracking all of the litigation challenging the
contraception mandate).
Unless this Court grants the Little Sisters of
the Poor’s petition for a writ of certiorari, their ability
and the ability of those similarly situated to
challenge the Department’s regulations will be at an
end. This is true, even though the court below failed
to understand the nature of the burden created by
those regulations and despite the fact that the
government has not been required to explain why it
is necessary to threaten these nuns with millions of
dollars in fines to achieve its objectives or even
precisely what its objectives in crafting this
particular regulatory mechanism might be. Several
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other circuit courts have also blessed the
Department’s regulations. See Wheaton College v.
Burwell, 2015 WL 3988356 (7th Cir. July 1, 2015),
East Texas Baptist v. Burwell, 2015 WL 3852811 (5th
Cir. June 22, 2015, Geneva College v. Health &
Human Services Secretary, 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir.
2015), Priests for Life v. Department of Health &
Human Services, 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Unless this Court grants certiorari, it will be
impossible for religious institutions in much of the
country to have their religious objections properly
considered, despite the clear Congressional mandate
that courts weigh the interest in government
regulation against the burdens those regulations
impose on sincere religious beliefs.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, amici respectfully believe
that this case warrants a grant of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN D. ADAMS
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